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I study necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a choice function to be ratio-
nalised in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T
(a tournament) such that for each feasible (ﬁnite) choice situation, the choice
coincides with the uncovered set of T. This notion of rationality explains not
only cyclical and context dependent choices observed in practice, but also
provides testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.
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A large body of experimental ﬁndings show that choices may be “cyclic”
and/or “context-dependent”, see, inter alia, Camerer, [2]; Loomes et al.,
[12]; and Tversky, [26]. More surprisingly, these patterns of choice do not
seem correlated in any way to the complexity of the decision situation that
a decision-maker (DM) may face when called upon (Loomes et al., [12]; and
Roelofsma et Read, [20]; Simon et Tversky, [24]).
The considerations that these kinds of choice are not rare phenomena in
every day life, and so may have considerable relevance in studies of economic,
social, and political behavior, motivated a substantial analytical rethink of
the behavioral regularities (consistency properties) postulated by standard
models of choice theory.
Standard models (under certainty) posit the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP), and so view a choice as the outcome of the maximisation
of a ﬁxed binary relation (rationale) for every feasible set.1 This postulate
precisely rules out context-dependent choices (an alternative, say x,i sc h o s e n
while a distinct one, say y, is rejected from a set, whereas a reverse pattern
of choice is made from a diﬀerent set to which they both belong -see, Ehlers
et Sprumont, [6]- as well as cyclic choices.2
Many alternatives to the standard choice models have been proposed to
account for one or both kinds of observed choice behavior. Preserving some
form of maximality of a single asymmetric and complete rationale (a tourna-
1See, inter alia, (Suzumura, [25]), (Moulin, [17]). For a recent survey on standard
choice theory see (Varian, [27]).
2A choice is cyclic whenever only x is chosen from {x,y},o n l yy from {y,z},a n do n l y
z from {x,z}.
1ment)d e ﬁned over all feasible sets it has been shown that a DM may exhibit
cyclic choices whenever his choosable alternative dominates at least “indi-
rectly” every other available one (top-cycle choice rule) (Ehlers et Sprumont,
[6]). This approach, however, leaves out the problem of context-dependent
choices, and, in particular, on the one hand, it leaves unexplained the rea-
soning followed by a DM when he deems rejectable an alternative directly
dominating the choosable one, and, on the other hand, the proposed rule
does not seem easily usable in practice.3
On the line of research that a DM uses simple mental mechanism based
o nj u s ts o m eo ft h ea v a i l a b l ei n f o r m a t i o n ,at w o - s t a g ec h o i c ep r o c e d u r ew h i c h
is able to accounts for both kinds of violations has been proposed (but not
fully axiomatised): if a DM eliminates unpreferred alternatives by means
of the sequential application of a ﬁxed pair of asymmetric and transitive
rationales, then the choice coincides with alternative which has the property
to be “uncovered” (Manzini et Mariotti, [14]).4
Is it possible to explain these kinds of violations of WARP by means of
one-reason decision making which is ‘naively simple’, and picks the uncovered
alternatives from every feasible set using all available information? In this
paper I provide an aﬃrmative answer to this question.
I propose the following choice rule dubbed uncovered set rule:a D M
3See, inter alia, (Gigerenzer et al., [8]).
4This is an ‘extension’ of a two-stage choice procedure where unpreferred alternatives
are eliminated by the sequential implementation of a ﬁxed ordered pair of asymmetric
rationales (Manzini et Mariotti, [13]). Other two-stage choice procedures can be found
in the literature (see, Houy, [9]; Manzini et Mariotti, [15]; Ok, [19]). A diﬀerent and
interesting approach is to explain the observed data with the least number of rationales
with no choice consistency requirements (Apesteguia et et Ballester, [1]; Kalai et al., [10]).
2deems the alternative x choosable from every feasible set whenever it has the
property that it dominates every other available one, say z, either directly
(x is chosen over z) or in two pairwise comparisons (it exists a distinct al-
ternative y such that x is chosen over y w h i c hi nt u r ni sc h o s e no v e rz -t w o
steps, so indirect, dominance of x over z).5 This choice rule ‘rationalises’ the
choice if it elicits the alternatives speciﬁed by the DM, for any feasible set.
When this happens the choice is said to behave according to the uncovered
set choice rule.
The uncovered set rule has sociological grounds, and it corresponds to
the idea of the existence of a dominance hierachy among elements of a given
set (i.e. humans societies, institutions, etc.), which depends on a number of
attributes and, above all, on what are the elements of the set under consid-
eration.6
Since it is not hard to imagine a choice situation where alternatives con-
ﬂict, it is plausible to think that a DM having pairwise inconsistent choices
(i.e. cyclical pairwise choices) when called upon to make a choice from larger
set may follow the suggested mental mechanism to construct a hierarchy of
dominance depending on the alternatives under consideration.
To see how this rule is able to account for context-dependent choices,
suppose that a DM is called upon to make a choice from X = {v,w,x,y,z},
a n di np a i r w i s ec h o i c e sh ed e e m sv choosable over x, y,a n dz, w choosable
over v, y,a n dz,w h e r e a sx over w, y over x and z,a n dﬁnally z over x.I f
5The suggested rule has been extensively studied in social science disciplines (see, for
instance, Fishburn, [7]; Landau, [11]; and Miller, [16]).
6Thorleif Schjelderupp-Ebbe was the ﬁrst scholar who discovered the existence of a
such rule among birds in the early twentieth century (Schjelderupp-Ebbe, [21]).
3he behaves according to suggest e dc h o i c er u l eh ew o u l dd e e mv, w,a n dx
choosable from X while rejectable the remaining alternatives (nevertheless
the fact that y is choosable from {x,y} and z from {x,z}), whereas when
called to make a choice from {x,y,z} he would deem y choosable while x and
z rejectable. From this example it is cle a rt h a tt h eu n c o v e r e ds e tc h o i c er u l e
accounts for cyclic choices as well. The maximality of the choice is assured
by the hierarchy of dominance that this rule produces among alternatives.7
O ft h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r eo nt h es u g g e s t e dc h o i c er u l et w ow o r k sa r e
particular relevant here. A full characterization of the uncovered set rule
has been provided by means of a family of rationales, one for each feasible
set (Duggan, [4]). Yet, using a tournament it has been shown that the
uncovered set choice rule is the least choice rule obeying properties relating
choices across tournaments and across sets (Moulin, [18]).8 The goal of this
paper is to identify the structure of the uncovered set choice rule by using
only consistency prop e r t i e sa c r o s ss e t s .
In the next section I formalise and characterise the uncovered set choice
rule while the last section concludes.
7See, inter alia, (Miller, [16]).
8A companion paper of Moulin’s work shows that the minimal covering set choice rule
corresponding to some alternatives of the uncovered set choice rule is the least choice rule
obeying consistency requirements of diﬀerent nature. (Dutta, [5]).
42 Uncovered Set Choice Rule
2.1 Nomenclature
Let X be a non-empty ﬁnite set made up of all distinct alternatives, and
denote by X the set of all non-empty subsets of X.G i v e n a s e t A ∈ X,
and x,y ∈ A, Ax,y (A) denotes the class of all non-empty proper subsets of
A with the property that x and y belong to them [i.e. Ax,y (A)={B ⊂ A :
x,y ∈ B}].
A choice rule f is a multivalued function f : X → X associating a choice
set f (A) ⊆ A to every A ∈ X.A s u s u a l t h e decisive axiom is assumed
to be part of the deﬁnition of f [i.e. A 6= ∅⇒|f (A)| > 1]. Saying f
is resolute means that the choice set from binary sets is a singleton [i.e.
|A| =2⇒ |f (A)| =1 ] .
A binary relation T on X is a tournament if it is asymmetric [for all
x,y ∈ A, xTy ⇒ ¬(yTx)] and complete [for all x,y ∈ A, xTy or yTx].
As usual xTy is read as follows: x dominates y in the pairwise comparison
between x and y.G i v e n x,y,z ∈ X, y is dominated by x in two steps if
xTz and zTy (i.e. xTzTy). Note that a restriction of T t oas e tA ∈ X,
denoted by T|A, is a tournament. A T −cycle in X is a sequence (x1,...,xk)
of distinct alternatives of X such that xiTxi+1 for i =1 ,...,k−1a n dxkTx 1,
for every 3 ≤ k ≤ |X| +1 .
Deﬁnition 3 Given a tournament T on X and A ∈ X, the uncovered set of
T on A, denoted by uc(T|A), is the set made up of all distinct alternatives
that dominate every other alternative in A in at most two steps: x ∈ uc(T|A)
if xTy or there exists z ∈ A such that xTzTy for every y ∈ A.
5Deﬁnition 4 Ac h o i c er u l ef is an uncovered set rule if there exists a tour-
nament T on X such that f (A)=uc(T|A) for every A ∈ X.
2.2 Axiomatisation
In this section I characterise the uncovered set choice rule by means of the
following axioms:
Axiom 5 (Weak Expansion). ∩i∈If (Ai) ⊆ f (∪i∈IAi).
The above axiom, denoted by WE, is also known as Sen’s condition γ
[Sen, [22] and [23]] and has a long history in axiomatic choice theory. This
condition states that if an alternative is deemed choosable from every element
of a given collection of non-empty sets, then it must still be deemed choosable
from their union.
Axiom 6 (Condorcet Consistency). If A ∈ X, x ∈ A,a n df ({x,y})={x}
for all y ∈ A\{x}, then {x} = f (A).
This axiom, denoted by CC, asserts that if an alternative is always cho-
sen in pairwise comparisons, then it should be uniquely chosen from a set
containing all those alternatives. An alternative that is always chosen in
pairwise comparisons is known as Cordorcet winner. Similar to WE, CC has
a long history in axiomatic choice theory as well [Moulin, [18]; Sen, [22]].
Axiom 7 (Restricted Chernoﬀ). If A ∈ X, |A| > 3,a n dx ∈ f (A),t h e n
∀y ∈ A\{x},∃B ∈ Ax,y (A) such that x ∈ f (B).
The above axiom, denoted by RC, is new to the best of my knowledge, and
it asserts that whenever an alternative x is chosen out of a set A ∈ X,t h e nx
6should be itself chosen from some proper subsets of A, each including diﬀerent
available alternatives in A (or equivalently, given a set A,i fx is never chosen
out of all proper subset of A including itself and another available alternative,
then x should not be chosen from A [i.e. if A ∈ X and x/ ∈∪ B∈Ax,y(A)f (B)f o r
some y ∈ A\{x},t h e nx/ ∈ f (A)]). This axiom is weaker than the canonical
Chernoﬀ axiom [i.e. if A,B ∈ X,a n dB ⊆ A, then either f (A) ∩ B = ∅ or
f (A) ∩ B ⊆ f (B)] (Chernoﬀ,[ 3 ] ) .
Axiom 8 (No-Discrimination). If x,y,z ∈ X, f ({x,y})=x, f ({y,z})=
y,a n df ({x,z})=z,t h e nf ({x,y,z})={x,y,z}.
This condition, denoted by N-D, is new as well and states that if a DM
has clear mind on three pairwise choices, but his pairwise choices are incon-
sistent, then when called upon to make a choice from a set including all those
alternatives the DM deems each of them equally choosable.
Theorem 9 Ac h o i c er u l ef is resolute and satisﬁes WE, CC, RC, and N-D
if, and only if, it is an uncovered set rule.
Proof. (If ). Let f be an uncovered set rule. By asymmetry of T,i t
follows that f is resolute. Next, WE, CC, RC, and N-D are checked.
(WE). Let the premise hold. Since x ∈ f (Ai)f o re v e r yi ∈ I and
f is an uncovered set rule, then x ∈ uc(T|Ai)f o re a c hi ∈ I.T h u s
x ∈ uc(T| ∪i∈I Ai), and so x ∈ f (∪i∈IAi). Observe that WE is vacuously
satisﬁed if ∩i∈If (Ai)i se m p t y .
(CC). Let the premise hold. Assume, to the contrary, that {x} 6= f (A).
Then {x} 6= uc(T|A), and so it exists y ∈ A\{x} such that f ({x,y})={y},
a contradiction.




for some y ∈ A\{x}. Recall
that the axiom of decisiveness is postulated to be part of the deﬁnition of f.
I show that x/ ∈ f (A). Assume, to the contrary, that x ∈ f (A). So, x ∈
uc(T|A). By assumption there exists y ∈ A\{x} such that x/ ∈ f ({x,y}).
Then {y} = f ({x,y}) by the decisive axiom, and so yTx.T h e nt h e r ee x i s t s
z ∈ A\{x,y} such that xTzTy.T h u s x dominates y in two steps, and so
x ∈ uc(T|{x,y,z}). Therefore x ∈ f ({x,y,z}),9 a contradiction.
(N-D). Since f is an uncovered set rule, the statement follows directly.
(Only if ). Let f be resolute and satisfy WE, CC, RC, and N-D.
Deﬁne T = {(x,y) ∈ X × X : {x} = f ({x,y})}. By construction and the
resoluteness of f, T is asymmetric. Since f is deﬁned on a universal domain,
it follows that T is complete. Therefore T is a tournament on X.
Next, the following claim :
f (T|A)=uc(T|A)( 1 )
is proved to hold for every A ∈ X.
A proof by induction based on the cardinality of A is provided.
By deﬁnition of f, its resoluteness, CC, and N-D claim (1) is trivially
true for all A ∈ X such that |A| ≤ 3.
Assume that (1) is true for all A ∈ X such that |A| = k,w h e r ek>3.
I prove that the result is true for |A| = k + 1. Let me proceed along the
following two steps: (1) x ∈ f (A) ⇒ x ∈ uc(T|A), (2) x ∈ uc(T|A) ⇒ x ∈
f (A).
Step 1: x ∈ f (A) ⇒ x ∈ uc(T|A).
9It comes from the fact that f is an uncovered set choice rule.
8Assume, to the contrary, that x ∈ A\uc(T|A). There exists y ∈ A\{x}
such that yTx and (for all z ∈ A\{x,y},i fxTz,t h e nyTz).
Since yTx,b yd e ﬁnition of T and the resoluteness of f it follows that
{x} 6= f ({x,y}). Take any B ∈ Ax,y (A)w i t h3≤ |B| < |A|.S i n c e x
does not dominate y in at most two steps, it follows that x/ ∈ uc(T|B). By
the inductive hypothesis it must be that x/ ∈ f (B). Since this is true for
every B ∈ Ax,y (A), then x/ ∈∪ B∈Ax,y(A)f (B). Hence, by RC x/ ∈ f (A), a
contradiction.
Step 2: x ∈ uc(T|A) ⇒ x ∈ f (A).
Let x ∈ uc(T|A). I prove that x ∈ f (A).
First let me introduce some more notation.
Let Ax denote the set made of all elements of A which are chosen over x
according to f in pairwise comparisons, i.e.
Ax = {y ∈ A\{x} : f ({x,y})=y};
similarly, let Ax denote the set made of all elements of A over which x is
chosen according to f in pairwise comparisons, i.e.
Ax = {y ∈ A\{x} : f ({x,y})=x}.
Partition A in {x}, Ax and Ax. I proceed according to whether Ax = ∅
or Ax 6= ∅.
Case 1: Ax = ∅
By CC it follows directly that {x} = f (A).
Case 2: Ax 6= ∅
Assume, to the contrary, that x ∈ A\f (A). Since Ax 6= ∅,t a k ea n y
y ∈ Ax.T h e n x ∈ uc(T|A\{y}), and so by the inductive hypothesis
9x ∈ f (A\{y}). Since {y} = f ({x,y}), by deﬁnition of T it follows that












WE it follows that x ∈ f (A), a contradiction.
Remark 10 The axioms are independent, as is argued next.
For an example violating only WE, let X = {x,y,z,w},d e ﬁne f ({x,y})=
f ({x,z})={x}, f ({y,z})=f ({y,w})={y}, f ({x,w})={w}, f ({z,w})=
{z}, f (A)=uc(T|A)f o rA ∈ X\X,a n df (X)={x,y}.N o t e t h a t f is
not an uncovered set rule since uc(T|X)={x,y,w},b u tw/ ∈ f (X). WE is
violated because w ∈ f ({x,y,w})a n dw ∈ f ({x,z,w}), but w/ ∈ f (X).
For an example violating only CC, let X = {x,y,z},d e ﬁne f ({x,y})=
f ({x,z})={x}, f ({y,z})={y},a n df (X)={x,y}.T h ec h o i c er u l ef is
n o ta nu n c o v e r e ds e tr u l eb e c a u s e{x} = uc(T|X), but {x,y} = f (X). CC
is violated because f ({x,y})=f ({x,z})={x},b u ty ∈ f (X).
For an example violating only RC, let X = {x,y,z,w},d e ﬁne f ({x,y})=
f ({x,z})={x}, f ({y,z})=f ({y,w})={y}, f ({x,w})={w}, f ({z,w})=
{z}, f (A)=uc(T|A)f o rA ∈ X\X,a n df (X)=X.T h ec h o i c er u l ef is
not an uncovered set rule because z/ ∈ uc(T|X)w h i l ef (X)=X.R C i s
violated because z is not revealed preferred in any proper subset including
the alternative y,b u tz ∈ f (X).
For an example violating only N-D, let X = {x,y,z},d e ﬁne f ({x,y})=
{x}, f ({y,z})={y}, f ({x,z})={z},a n df (X)={x,y}.T h ec h o i c er u l e
f is not an uncovered set rule because z ∈ uc(T|X), but z/ ∈ f (X). N-D is
violated because it exists a cyclea m o n gt h ep a i r w i s ec h o i c e s ,b u tz/ ∈ f (X).
10For an example violating only the resoluteness condition, let X = {x,y,z},
deﬁne f ({x,y})={x,y}, f ({x,z})={x}, f ({y,z})={y},a n df (X)=
{x,y}.T h e c h o i c e r u l e f is not an uncovered set rule because uc(T|X)=
∅ while f (X)={x,y}. The resoluteness condition is violated because
|f ({x,y})| =2 . 10
3 Concluding comments
This paper formalised a one-reason decision making which has been exten-
sively studied in mathematical sociology (Landau, [11]) and in voting theory
(Fishburn, [7]; Miller, [16]): uncovered set rule.
Ii d e n t i ﬁed necessary and suﬃcient condition for a choice function to
coincide with the uncovered set of a ﬁxed asymmetric and complete binary
relation (tournament). Only consistency property relating choices across set
were used.
Its central features are simplicity and reasonableness. It is simple to
use because it corresponds to the naive idea that the choosable alternative
should have the property to dominate every other available one in at most
two pairwise choices. It is a reasonable choice rule because it can be tested
by some mild consistency properties. Moreover, not only it has the advan-
tage to account for cyclic and context-dependent choices preserving some
form of maximality, but also to explain what kind of psychological mecha-
nism a decision-maker may follows when he express rejectable an alternative
dominating the choosable one.
These anomalies in observed choice behavior can go with rather diﬀerent
10Note that here CC does not apply because it does not exist a Condorcet winner.
11psychological motivations and may have diﬀerent alternative explanations.
Yet, the uncovered set choice rule is a simple and reasonable rule that can
shed some light on the complex underlying links between the commonly ob-
served violations of WARP and the psychological mechanisms driving deci-
sion behaviors.
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